Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills (1993)

By Nityanshi Rao

Overview

Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1993) is a U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does not prohibit a public school district from providing a sign-language interpreter to a deaf student attending a private religious school under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).

Summary

In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment barred a public school district from providing a sign-language interpreter to a deaf student attending a Catholic high school under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). James Zobrest, the student, had been provided an interpreter by the Catalina Foothills School District while attending public school. However, when he enrolled in a private Catholic high school, the district refused to continue providing the interpreter, citing concerns that it would violate the Establishment Clause by facilitating religious education at taxpayer expense.

Zobrest’s family sued, claiming the refusal violated his rights under both the IDEA and the Free Exercise Clause. The district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the school district, arguing that providing the interpreter would violate the "primary effects" prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) test, which prohibits government actions that have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.

In a 5-4 decision authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. Rehnquist argued that the Establishment Clause did not prevent religious institutions from benefiting from neutral, publicly sponsored social welfare programs, such as those under the IDEA.

The Court determined that the provision of a sign-language interpreter to a student at a religious school was a neutral action, as the interpreter would only be present due to the private choice of the student’s parents, not government endorsement of religion. Rehnquist drew parallels with earlier cases like Mueller v. Allen (1983), which allowed tuition reimbursements for students attending religious schools, and Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind (1986), which permitted vocational assistance to a blind person studying for the ministry. He also rejected arguments about the symbolic endorsement of religion and noted that the physical presence of the interpreter in the school did not change the program’s constitutionality.

The dissent, led by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, argued that the Court should not have addressed the constitutional issue and should have focused on statutory questions. Blackmun expressed concerns that allowing a public employee to participate in a religious school’s activities would lead to direct government involvement in religious indoctrination. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in a separate dissent, argued that the case should have been remanded for consideration on statutory grounds rather than constitutional issues.

Impact

The Zobrest decision was a pivotal moment in interpreting the Establishment Clause, marking a shift towards a more permissive stance on the involvement of government-funded services in religious settings. The Court held that as long as the benefit is neutrally available to all students, regardless of the type of school they attend, it does not violate the First Amendment. The ruling clarified that religious institutions can share in publicly sponsored social welfare programs, such as IDEA services, without breaching the separation of church and state, as long as the primary beneficiary is the student, not the school.

The decision overruled the Ninth Circuit’s application of the Lemon test, emphasizing that the primary effect of the interpreter’s service was to benefit the disabled student, not to advance religion. This case set a precedent that government aid to individuals attending religious schools is permissible when it is part of a neutral, generally applicable program.

The ruling also influenced future cases, such as Agostini v. Felton (1997), which allowed federally funded remedial services to be provided to students in parochial schools. The Zobrest decision broadened the Court’s view on the intersection of religious education and public funding, reinforcing that the government’s role in supporting individual rights, such as education for disabled students, does not inherently violate the Establishment Clause. At the same time, the dissenting opinions highlighted concerns about the potential erosion of the separation between church and state, warning of the risks of government involvement in religious indoctrination.

The case remains a cornerstone in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, shaping the balance between religious freedom and government neutrality in public programs.

Court Documents

To read the full Supreme Court Opinions and Dissents, click here:

Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993)

[https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/509/1/](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/509/1/)

To read the Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit Opinion, click here:

Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, No. 91-15755 (9th Cir. 1992)

[https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/91-15755/91-15755-1992-07-31.html](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/91-15755/91-15755-1992-07-31.html)

To listen to the oral argument of the Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District case, click here:

[https://www.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-94](https://www.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-94)

To read more about the Lemon v. Kurtzman case, click here:

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)

[https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/602/](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/602/)