In re Mark C.H. (2010)
- 2 days ago
- 4 min read
By Marcus Rosenberg
Overview:
This Surrogate’s Court opinion highlights a serious problem in Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act Article 17-A (SCPA Article 17-A) guardianships. Once a guardian of the person is appointed for an individual with a disability, whether it be intellectual or developmental, periodic reports back to the court are not required. The case here uses the situation of Mark C.H., an autistic young man living at the Anderson Center for Autism, to show how dangerous that gap in the code can be. Even though Mark had a trust built for him that consisted of millions, the proposed guardian and the co-trustee did almost nothing to monitor his well-being. They also declined to use the trust funds to improve his life until they were forced into doing so by the court during the guardianship proceeding. Ultimately, the court concluded that due process cannot tolerate a guardianship system that grants complete control over a person’s life for decades without monitoring. The court also reads in a requirement of yearly reporting and court review going forward, which was modeled on the reporting expectations used in Mental Hygiene Law Article 81 (MHL Article 81) guardianships.
Summary:
Shortly after birth, a boy named Mark C.H. was adopted by a wealthy woman named Marie H. From early childhood, it was evident that Mark had significant disabilities, later being diagnosed with autism. As Marie’s health declined, it was clear she could no longer properly care for Mark at home, thus in 2003 he was placed at the Anderson Center for Autism in Staatsburg, New York. When Marie died in 2005, she left an estate of about $12 million for Mark and his brother, with Mark’s trust being worth nearly $3 million. A petition to appoint a SCPA Article 17-A guardian for Mark was filed in 2007. Along with this petition were medical submissions, describing Mark as profoundly impaired, nonverbal, and prone to aggressive behaviors when in unfamiliar settings. This led professionals to recommend he not be brought to court. At the initial hearing, only the petitioner and Mental Hygiene Legal Services (MHLS) appeared, but the questioning was still able to get to the root of the problem. Since Marie’s death, the petitioner never made contact with Mark or the Anderson Center to determine Mark’s needs, and despite being a co-trustee, had not spent any of the trust’s assets on Mark’s behalf. The court adjourned the matter, required the corporate trustee bank to appear, and appointed a guardian ad litem to investigate. The bank’s appearance prompted the court to direct either personal visits and a needs assessment or use of a qualified professional to evaluate Mark’s situation. The trustees retained a certified care manager, who communicated with the staff at the Anderson Center as well as Mark. The certified care manager was able to communicate with Mark and learn about his interests. She also learned some troubling facts, including that he had essentially no visitors for years, did not go on vacations, and stayed on campus grounds even when other students were leaving for holidays. Through this evaluation, the care manager was able to identify some quality-of-life activities that Mark would benefit from. She also discovered that the medicine Mark was using had potential side-effects whereas other medicine for the same issue could be used with less side effects. After this lengthy intervention, the care manager was retained on an ongoing basis.
The court then uses these facts to explain why SCPA Article 17-A’s lack of monitoring is potentially unconstitutional. Under these rules, a guardian of the person has almost total control over core liberty interests (medical decisions, residence, travel, work), and without consistent review the guardianship can go on for decades without any determination as to whether it remains necessary or whether the guardian is best serving the interests of who it has been appointed to help. Applying Mathews v. Eldridge, the court emphasizes the magnitude of the private interests at stake, the high risk of erroneous deprivation and ongoing harm without oversight, and the value of a safeguard like yearly reporting. The court also finds the state’s interests aligned with monitoring because New York policy is to promote independence and protect rights for people with developmental disabilities. The opinion also points to international human rights norms, including the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) emphasis on providing safeguards against abuse, with regular review being one of the best ways of achieving such a goal. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is also referenced as its protections of movement, association, and privacy help reinforce the conclusion that guardianship authority should not be unchecked. The court therefore appoints the petitioner as guardian, as Mark is in need of one and no better candidate has been presented. The guardian has been ordered to report annually to the court using reporting requirements like those in MHL Article 81.
Impact:
The lasting impact of this case is that it reframes SCPA Article 17-A guardianship from a protective family tool to a state-sanctioned transfer of fundamental liberty to another person, something which cannot be constitutionally one and done. Mark’s story sets a line in the sand of sorts as it shows that intentional abuse is not the only way to trigger guardianship review, it can happen through deprivation when resources are there that can be used. By insisting on periodic reporting and review, the court pushes towards the MHL Article 81 model which says that guardians should be accountable and should remain justified over time. Ensuring this requires a system that is capable of detecting when a guardianship is either failing or is no longer necessary. At the broadest level, the opinion issued here signals a shift in values from viewing disability guardianship as permanent toward viewing it as monitored intervention that must be continually proven to be apt.
Court Documents:
In re Mark C.H.
