Jankowski Lee & Associates v. Cisneros (1996)
- 4 days ago
- 4 min read
By Marcus Rosenberg
Overview:
Andrew Rusinov, a tenant at River Park Apartments (RPA) with multiple sclerosis (MS), asked management for a parking accommodation because his condition made it difficult, and sometimes even urgent, to get from a far space to his unit. The manager of the complex, Sue Sellin, denied the request without asking for any forms of documentation or attempting any follow-up. She acted in this way because to her eye, Rusinov did not appear disabled when he walked. After Rusinov filed a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the management increased the number of handicapped spaces at the apartments, but still Rusinov lacked a reliable close space. HUD’s Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the apartment owners and their agents violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation. As a result of this, they were ordered to assign Rusinov a spot as close as possible to his building and also imposed a civil penalty alongside compensatory damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed HUD’s final order and denied the petition for review. The dissent in this case argued that the landlords lacked sufficient notice of a mobility-related disability and Rusinov did not provide documentation when he first asked.
Summary:
Rusinov was diagnosed with MS in 1982 and experienced severe disability early on, which would come in waves. Despite his attempts to conceal the disability to avoid the stigma that came along with it, the records showed that his condition severely limited major life activities. He moved into the RPA complex in 1986 and disclosed on his application that he had MS. RPA consisted of two buildings with 108 parking spaces and many residents who were either elderly or mobility impaired. Parking operated on a strict first-come, first-served basis. Because of this, Rusinov consistently had difficulty finding a close space because the handicap spaces, along with other nearby spots, were often full. This presented serious problems for Rusinov as he struggled with walking long distances and lacked control over his bladder, sometimes requiring immediate access to his bathroom. In fall 1992, Rusinov and his father put in a request for either an assigned space or enough handicapped spaces to meet his needs. The office secretary then referred them to Sellin, who immediately denied the request with no further inquiry, essentially telling him to take his chances. Rusinov then filed a HUD complaint on March 8, 1993, alleging that he had asked management to increase handicap spots or assign him a spot. Shortly after the complaint, Jankowski Lee & Associates (petitioners) increased the number of handicapped spaces at each building.
In response to the prior events, HUD issued a determination of reasonable cause against the petitioners as well as a charge of discrimination alleging violations of FHA §§ 3604(f)(2) and 3604(f)(3)(B), leading to an ALJ two-day hearing. The ALJ found that the petitioners failed to make a reasonable accommodation and ordered injunctive relief. Alongside that order, they also required petitioners to assign Rusinov a space as close as possible, imposed a $2,500 civil penalty, and awarded $2,500 in compensatory damages. On review, the Seventh Circuit applied the deferential standard, reversing only if the agency acted unlawfully or without substantial evidence. The court emphasized that it would not reweigh the evidence. The petitioners’ first argument they raised was that they did not know the extent of Rusinov’s mobility limits and that he had the burden to produce documentation. The court rejected this argument, emphasizing that the petitioners knew he had MS, were told he needed close parking due to this disability, and despite all that, they still denied the accommodation without seeking any further information. The court stressed that disability should not be determined by outward appearance and that landlords should request documentation if they are skeptical. The petitioners then argued that they were in fact compliant when they increased handicap spaces after the complaint. The court again rejected their argument, holding that the FHA guarantees a reasonable accommodation, with reasonableness being fact specific. The ALJ’s finding that added spaces still did not reasonably solve Rusinov’s access problem was supported by evidence showing that many tenants had handicap permits, leading to them often being full, especially at night. Finally, some of the petitioners argued that evidence tying certain individuals to liability was insufficient. The court reiterated that owners can be vicariously liable for their agents’ acts and found evidence that the managing partner participated in the decision and that the ownership group was sufficiently connected to the property.
Impact:
Overall, this case is significant because it reinforces a tenant-friendly reading of the FHA’s reasonable accommodation duty with regards to housing-type services like parking. Put simply, it can be interpreted like this: once a housing provider has notice of a qualifying disability and receives an accommodation request connected to said disability, ignorance can no longer be claimed as a defense if they deny the request based on appearances or assumptions. The majority’s holding pressures landlords into being more interactive with their tenants who have disabilities, because refusal to even inquire is going to completely null any of their potential defenses. The decision also puts more emphasis on true functionality rather than just good intentions as this case showed: a landlord making some changes, like adding a few handicapped spaces, is not enough, the accommodation must be reasonable within the context of the situation and provide equal opportunity to enjoy and use the housing structure. The court’s unwillingness to relieve the less-involved figures from liability shows that FHA compliance is not only the on-site manager’s responsibility. Owners and managing partners can be held accountable when they participate in, approve of, or even benefit from decisions made by their agents. This holding incentivizes stronger forms of training, better written policies, and more consistent accommodation procedures. The dissent in this case highlights a prevalent question in disability law, how much notice is enough when impairments vary from person to person and are not obvious from the outside. The majority’s resolution seems to tackle this to a certain extent though, as they are pushing the system toward requiring landlords to engage with their tenants harboring disabilities rather than dismissing them.
Court Documents:
Jankowski Lee & Associates v. Cisneros (1996)
