Pierce v. The District of Columbia (2015)

By Matthew Chin

Overview

The Plaintiff, William Pierce, was sentenced to 60 days at the District of Columbia’s (DOC) Correctional Treatment Facility (CTF), where he was not tested to see if he needed accommodations during the duration of his incarceration, despite the facility being well aware of the fact that he was deaf. The District claimed that written notes and lip-reading were sufficient for communication and denied Pierce’s constant requests for an interpreter. Pierce filed a lawsuit against them and motioned for a summary judgment, arguing that the District blatantly violated his rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Claim I), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Claim II), and faced retaliation from the District after he tried to exercise his rights under both acts (Claim III). The District filed its own motion for summary judgment against Pierce on those three claims. The Court approved Pierce’s motion for summary judgment for Claims I and II, and denied the District’s motion for summary judgment on all three claims. The third claim that Pierce filed for was denied, as the court stated that there was a dispute of fact that needed to be resolved.

Summary

William Pierce is a resident of the District of Columbia and is profoundly deaf, with other serious health conditions. While Pierce can make auditory sounds, he cannot speak and solely relies on American Sign Language (ASL) to communicate. In terms of reading and writing, his skills are very much underdeveloped when compared to a hearing individual, and Pierce only used simple phrases when texting on a cellphone, which was rare. In February of 2012, after pleading guilty to a domestic abuse charge against his then-partner, Pierce was sentenced to 60 days in the District’s CTF.

When looking at this case, the Court found two major issues of contention between the two parties. The first being about Pierce’s ability to communicate effectively in English, whether through written notes, lip-reading, and in some instances, volunteered interpreters. The other was the extent to which Pierce requested an ASL interpreter. Analyzing these two factors played an important role in the Court’s decision regarding the third claim of retaliation.

With regard to these two issues, the Court examined specific instances in which the parties have conflicting descriptions of Pierce’s experience at the facility. Those instances were: (1) the prison facility’s medical intake and health services, (2) his inmate rehabilitation classes, (3) the protective custody procedures that were employed in this case, and (4) the prison’s provision of telecommunications, official notifications, and visitation.

1. Pierce’s Ability to Communicate Effectively during Medical Intake and Health Processes

Upon entering the DOC’s custody, it is mandatory for inmates to have a medical screening and examination, in accordance with normal inmate intake procedures. The physicals conducted at the Central Detention Facility were conducted by professionals from a private, non-profit entity that had a contract with the DOC called Unity Healthcare. The first contention arises here about whether Pierce requested or even needed an ASL interpreter present at the intake exam. This also includes his later interactions with other medical professionals regarding his other conditions.  

Based on Pierce’s account of the story, the prison medical personnel simply assumed that they were effectively communicating with him through exchanges of written notes and gestures, despite his constant requests for an ASL interpreter. Citing the initial intake meeting with Dr. Fidelis Doh, Pierce requested an ASL interpreter, as he has multiple complicated health conditions that he could only explain through ASL. Dr. Doh simply responded that they can use written communication. Despite several pleas for an interpreter, the doctor never arranged for one to be provided and instead continued on with the exam, pointing at the medical jargon-filled questions on the screen and orally asking questions to Pierce, assuming he could read lips. As a result, due to Pierce’s inability to communicate his health complications, he was not able to get the preventative medicine necessary for his [undisclosed medical condition]. As a result, he allegedly experienced [undisclosed medical condition] in prison. He was eventually able to obtain the right medicine, but only after the incident.

The District retorted, arguing that Pierce never requested an ASL interpreter and, from their perspective, didn’t believe there was a need for one. The District points out that Dr. Doh was able to communicate effectively through written notes and that he reported back that Pierce can read lips. The District admits that Dr. Doh did show questions to Pierce from the screen, but pointed out that Pierce answered all of them, whether through gestures or writing, proving that he did understand the questions that were on the screen. The District also contended that if there were miscommunications, Pierce did not suffer any consequences, and that the episode with his [undisclosed medical condition], he was able to receive the right medications.

2. Pierce’s Access to Rehabilitative Classes

During his time at CTF, Pierce was enrolled in two classes: an anger management and substance abuse issues program and a class on graphic design. The anger management and substance abuse program had lectures, videos, and group discussions over the course of six to seven class sessions. The graphic design class required inmates to complete computer-based modules that contained written instructions, written tests, and hands-on projects. Inmates were to take on these tasks individually and at their own pace, with a CTF employee monitoring their progress, offering assistance if needed.

The main issue here is to what extent Pierce was able to understand from the program and class, and whether he was able to benefit from either without an interpreter. According to Pierce, without an interpreter, he struggled in both the program and class, citing that during his first group session with the anger management/substance abuse program, he allegedly became agitated and, at one point, even walked out of the session. He claims that after the first session, and several times after, he wrote to the instructor requesting an interpreter to help him understand the lectures. He also claims that his partner had inquired about securing an interpreter for him. In response to their requests, Pierce alleges that Warden Fulton finally contacted Gallaudet University, which is known to be a university for the deaf in Washington D.C., to ask for the services of an interpreter. Upon finding out that they would have to pay for the interpreter’s services, the prison officials refused to pay for such services and began seeking alternative solutions. Based on these facts, Pierce believed that the District did nothing to look for and/or secure an outside ASL interpreter to assist him in communicating what was being taught in his program and class. Regarding the graphic design course, the only help that was provided was by another inmate (Justin Clary), who allegedly asked to volunteer to sign for Pierce for two to three classes. Clary was not a qualified interpreter; rather, he was also hard of hearing, and both men happened to be enrolled in the same class. Pierce claims that Clary was not able to interpret the course material effectively or accurately.

The District maintained that Pierce successfully participated in both the anger management/substance abuse program and the graphic arts course. The District also contends that Pierce was provided an interpreter for the entirety of anger management/substance abuse after his request following the first session. According to the District, Assistant Warden Fulton employed Clary to attend the sessions to interpret for Pierce. Upon receiving a complaint from Pierce that Clary was not an adequate interpreter, Fulton contacted Gallaudet University and the ADA Coordinator for DOC to find an interpreter. However, they ceased their search when the chaplain (a member of the clergy) volunteered and interpreted for Pierce in four classes. In terms of whether Pierce benefited from the program, the District noted that he ultimately experienced positive behavioral changes, specifically less drinking and better control of his anger. As for the graphic design course, the District insists that Pierce never requested nor was it necessary. The instructor observed Pierce to be a quick learner and had performed better than some of the non-hearing-impaired students in the course, completing six modules.

3. The Circumstances Surrounding Pierce’s Time in Protective Custody

During his time in incarceration, Pierce was involved in an incident with another inmate, which ended with Pierce being shoved down by the other inmate. Pierce filed a complaint to Tutwiler, his assigned case manager, about the incident, and Tutwiler allegedly wrote a note to Pierce asking him if he wanted to be placed in protective custody. Pierce was unsure of what protective custody entailed, as Tutwiler had not given him details as to what protective custody would be, so he wrote back, “If necessary”. The unit manager of medical 82, Points visited Pierce’s cell and wrote to him asking him to write out “I fear for my safety” on a form. Pierce refused at first as he didn’t understand why he had to, but eventually caved at Point’s insistence. 

Pierce would end up spending 25% of his time in incarceration in protective custody, which consisted of 23 hours per day in solitary confinement over the course of at least seven days. Pierce was also unaware of the fact that this was entirely voluntary, and there were procedures he could take to end his protective custody status. Allegedly, Pierce later reached out to Allen, the Facilities Grievance Coordinator, saying he did not understand the ramifications of protective custody, to which Allen wrote back, “You should have read it before you signed it”. Pierce responded, “I had no choice because they told me to sign it”. During this entire sequence, Pierce did not have an ASL interpreter, nor did the officials attempt to explain to him what protective custody was when they first suggested it, nor when he signed the papers.

At some point, Pierce reached out to another case manager, Griffin, asking to leave protective custody and return to the general population. Griffin passed that message on to another staff member, who told Fulton of Pierce’s request. He was also allegedly told that Pierce wanted a lawyer there when he signed the waiver to return to the general population, which Fulton thought to be unusual, but didn’t ask why Pierce didn’t want to leave protective custody despite wanting to earlier. Pierce alleged that Fulton advised the staff to keep Pierce in protective custody and review his status in one week. He was then moved to the Special Management unit (SMU), where Pierce believed to be worse than Medical 82, as he was still on a 23-hour lockdown without a roommate and the only view outside was a small window in the metal door of his cell. 

The District has a completely different perspective on Pierce’s protective custody. In response to Pierce’s claims about his interaction with Points, the District contends that Points had fully explained, in writing, what “protective custody” meant and conveyed to Pierce that if he wanted to be placed in protective custody, he would need to explain why on the form. It was then that Pierce voluntarily wrote “I fear for my safety. HIV +” and then signed it, which would mean that Points did not pressure Pierce to write on that form.

The District also claimed that because Pierce signed the protective custody request form, Fulton was prohibited from removing Pierce until he signed the protective custody waiver, stating that he no longer feared for his safety. Pierce allegedly understood this but refused to sign it. The seven-day review of an inmate in protective custody is a CTF policy, so Fulton was simply adhering to facility policy. Lastly, the District contends that the conditions of Pierce’s protective custody were the same at Medical 82 as it was at the SMU.

4. Deaf Inmates’ Rights to Telecommunications, Official Notifications, and Visitation

The last point that the parties were in contention about was the privileges that inmates are typically given by the CTF, and whether Pierce and other deaf inmates are afforded equal access to these privileges. In regard to phone privileges, a typical hearing inmate is permitted to use the telephone for 10 minutes at a time, and do not need to schedule appointments in advance to use the phones. According to Pierce, his telecommunications had many more limitations, not including the fact that the CTF only provided an outdated TTY device when compared to the modern videophone. In terms of access, for Pierce, it varied based on where he was being housed, as DOC officials required that he make an appointment in advance, as the TTY device was only available in his case manager’s office, and that his case manager or a CTF employee needed to be present. The case manager’s hours were typically only Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., which restricted the times he could use the TTY device, on top of the fact that Pierce claims that the case manager on duty only granted his requests to use the device at her convenience. When he was able to gain access to the device, Pierce alleges that his calls were restricted to 10 minutes, even though communicating using a TTY device takes substantially more time than communicating using a telephone.

In their defense, the District maintained that Pierce was given access to the TTY device when he requested and did not ask for the videophone while at CTF. Furthermore, the District also claimed that the TTY device had to be kept in the case manager’s office for security reasons, as it poses a security risk or can become contraband. The CTF staff must also be present because, unlike regular inmates’ telephones, the TTY device is not subjected to security monitoring and recording.  

Pierces also alleges that inequalities exist against deaf individuals in the visitation process and the official notification announcements that are made in the CTF. With respect to visitation, Pierce was handcuffed during at least one of the visits from his partner and his mother, which is problematic as Pierce’s main form of communication is ASL, which requires his hands. The District reasoned that 1) Pierce never requested any accommodations for these visitations during his time at the CTF and 2) that they were simply following CTF policy, which requires all inmates in protective custody to be restrained when outside their cells. The District also points out (and Pierce concedes) that they removed his handcuffs after his mother explained the situation to the CTF authorities. As for the official notifications, Pierce claimed that his ability to hear the official announcements, such as emergency lockdowns, fire, or other emergencies, remained unresolved. With no visual alarm to alert him of these things, it led to him being constantly anxious and worried that he would miss any important information. In response, the District contends that Pierce’s anxiety is unfounded as the CTF’s alarms are not only very loud, but have strobe lights that the District claims can be seen inside of the cells, like Pierce’s. As for important information, the District claimed that these announcements are not made auditorily, but rather, written notifications and announcements are posted on bulletin boards in housing units. 

In regard to claims I and II, the court found the District guilty of violating Pierce’s rights before the events in contention above. For claim I, under Title II, specifically section 12132, the ADA protects individuals with disabilities from being denied benefits or excluded from participating in the benefits of services, programs, or activities for any reason. As for claim II, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act protects individuals from being denied benefits of or being subjected to discrimination under any program or activity conducted by a government agency on the sole basis of their disability. The court finds that Pierce’s rights under these laws were violated by the District when Pierce was taken into custody, as the District failed to evaluate Pierce for any accommodations that would allow him to have meaningful access to prison programs and services. The court also points out that the District’s employees and contractors knew that Pierce was deaf, but chose to assume that he could read (and understand) people’s lips as they spoke and the notes written to him. Therefore, under the text and purpose of both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the court can easily conclude, without a doubt, that the District fell far short of what the law requires from the start. Pierce’s motion for summary judgment on Claims I and II was granted, and the District’s motion for summary judgment was denied in its entirety. On Pierce’s retaliation claim, the court denied summary judgment as there were important factual disagreements between the District and Pierce, which would require a jury, not the court, to determine the facts. This doesn’t mean that Pierce lost this claim; mainly, it would need to be taken a step further to determine the legitimacy behind the claim.

Impact

Despite inmates having many of their privileges taken away when an individual is incarcerated, they still have access to some rights. Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ensure that inmates with disabilities are 1) not discriminated against based solely on their disability and 2) have full and equal access to the programs and services offered by prison facilities. The way the District treated Pierce not only showed the damaging stereotypes held by individuals regarding deaf people, but also the lack of care for him as a person, as they simply assumed because he was responding. The conclusion of Pierce v. The District of Columbia is a sign that the ADA is continuing to establish a more equitable environment for disabled individuals amongst able people.

Court Documents

Pierce v. The District of Columbia, No. 1:13-cv-00134 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2015). https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2013cv00134/158123/90/ 

Citations

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C § 701 et Seq. PDF, U.S. Government Publishing Office, accessed September 27, 2025, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-799/pdf/COMPS-799.pdf

Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, as Amended, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Sat. 327 (1990). PDF, archive.ada.gov, accessed September 27, 2025, https://archive.ada.gov/pubs/adastatute08.pdf